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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THI STATE OF UTAH
SHERMAN S. DALTON,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

!!

Case No. 8943

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,

WAYNE RASMUSSEN COMPANY, and

GUARANTEE INSURANCE COMPANY

Defendants and Respondents.

i
)

PETITION lQft REHEARING
The Wayne Rasmussen Company and
Guarantee Insurance Company, defendants and
responde~ts

herein, respectfully petition this

Honorable Court for a rehearing and reargument

in the above entitled case.

The petition is

based upon the following grounds:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DALTON WAS

AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO HOLD THAT OBERHANSLY V. TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPAlr! WAS
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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CONTROLLING.
POINT III

THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTION OF
THE COMl'USSION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS

IN REVERSING ITSELF WITHOUT TAKING ANY ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE.

WHEREFORE, the defendants and respondents, petitioners herein, pray that the
judgment and opinion of the court be reexamined and a reargument permitted of the

entire case.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY • QUINilEY & NEBEKER
GRANT C • .UDNESEN
STEPHEN B • NEBEKER

Attorneys for Petitioners
CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL
I, Stephen B. Nebeker, one of the
attorneys for the defendants and respondents,

do hereby certify that I have carefully examined
and considered the foregoing petition for rehearing, know the contents thereof, and that in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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my opinion the same is well founded in point
of law and is not made for the mere purpose
of delaying the determination of said eause.
STEPHEI~

B • NEBEKER

ARGUMDT
POil~T

I

THE COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT DALTON

WAS AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR.
The court, in its opinion in the instant case, states that because the commission

was

n*

* * laboring

under a misapprehension as

to the holding of this court in Oberhansly v.
Travelers Insurance ComRany, 5 Utah 2d 1.5, 295
P.2d 1093, the award must be vacated."

The

Industrial Commission finally found that Dalton
was not an employee of the defendant, Wayne
Rasmussen Company, but that he was either a
volunteer or an independent
(Italics ours).

contracto~

(R. 96)

This court has completely

ignored the Commission's conclusion that if
Dalton was not a volunteer then he must of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

necessity have been an independent contractor.
Even if the Commission was laboring
under a misapprehension as to this court's
holding in the Oberha.nsly case, suprA, this
court must still determine if the final order
of the commission denying compensation is valid
on the ground that Dalton was an independent
contractor.

This court has repeatedly announced

that it is committed to the right to control
test in determini:rt.g whether a workm.an is an

employee or an independent contractor.

Respond-

ent, in its initial brief, argued that under the
right of control 'test, Dalton was clearly an
independent contractor at the time he was injured.
Respondent does not wish to burden this cou.rt

by repeating the argument and citation of authorities contained in Point I of 1ts brief.

Suffice

it to sa.y that the right to control the driver
of an automobile depends upon whether the employer
has the right to control the when, where and how
o.f the operation of the vehicle.

It is obvious

that the Wayne Rasmussen Company did not have
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the right to control when Dalton returned to

Ogden, where he. drove the car and how he drove
"whether slow or fast, behind or around traffic•
inside or outside the lane of traffic, etc.•

See fox v. Lavender, 89 Utah 115, .56 P.2d 1049.
!he statutory definition of independent contractor contained in 35-1-42,

u.c.A.

195.3 states:

•* * * . !he

term 'independent

contractor,' as herein used, is
,defined. to be any person, associa-

tion or corporation engaged in the
performance· of any work for another, who, while so engaged, is
independent of the employer in all
that pertains to the execution of

the -v;ork, is not subject to the
rule or control or the employer,
is engaged only in the performance
o£ a definite job or piece of work,
and is subordinate to the employer
only in effecting a result in
accordance with the employer's
design.•

Dalton was clearly an independent
contractor as that term has been defined by the
Utah Legislature.

He was not subject to the

rule or control of the employer, was engaged
only in the performance of a definite job md
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
- l:i Act,
- administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was subordinate to his employer only in
effecting a result.
In its opinion in the case at bar,
this cou:rt states:

"* * * (T)he evidence was
clear that the $25.00 less the
price of the bus tiekets was to
be compensation .for the job."
(Itaiics ours]
This court has previously held that the manner
and basis of payment is one element to be used

in determining whether there is_an employeremployee relationship.
Industrial
1027.

Commission~

Stover Bedding Co. v.

99 Utah 423, 107 P.2d

Even if Dalton did receive some compensa-

tion for his 'WOrk, this fact does not make him

an employee.
a4~~~e

On the contrary, the lump sum

payment to Dalton and Porter confirms

Respondents contention that he was an independ. );</' \

'

/ej!ft contractor.

/np~lly
-

t .. ·

An independent contractor is

paid on a job basis rather than a

'"

·~,hourly..._or
.·,:

'

weekly scale.

The fact that Dalton

,,

arid Porter received $25.00 to bring two cars
b&!;k ,:eo Ogden is consistent with the manner cf
'
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payment to an independent contracter.

The

final order of the Commission stated, in substance, that if the money Dalton received was
expense money. then he would be a volunteer;
but if the money received wl!uJ compeusatien.

then Dalton would be an independent contractor.
In any event, he was not an employee, subject
to the right of control of the Wayne Rasmussen
Company.
The final order of the Commission

denying compensation is correct because

D~~on

was an independent contractor at the time he

was injured.

Thi$ court erred in failing to

find that if Dalton was not a volunteer, as
that term is used in the Oberhallsly case, supra,

then he must have been an ind.epandent contractor.
POINT II

THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING 10 HOLD THAT OBimHANSLY V • TRAVELERS !)lSUlANCI COMPANY WAS

CONTROLLING •

In reviewing a case appealed to this

- .., -
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court from the Industrial

Commission~

this

court has repeatedly held 1:h at the findings of

the commission will not be disturbed in the
absence of capricious or arbitrary action.

In

the opinion in the instant case, this court

stated:

•* * *

In fact there is no

evidence .from vllrlch it could

reasonably be.· found that plaintilt volunte-ered to take the trip
and a:rive back a car for no remuneratiQn. Beitner.the plaintiff
nor the comxanyis representative
so testil'ie • There was no eviaen-ce ··of ;any reiatfonsni£ between

the Eartles to make sue a conplusion reasonable. On the contr§!fY
the evidence was clear that the
$25.00 less the price of the bus
tickets was to be. compensation for
the job·'' (Italics ours)
There is evidence in the record from
which the commission could have found that. Dalton
v-olunteered to take the trip and drive back a car

for no remuneration.

Purkey, office manager and bookkeeper
for the Porter Dalt,on Partnership and the Wayne

Rasmussen Company, testified that when Dalton
was informed that two cars were in Rock Springs
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

he volunteered •Well •. J1! will ..go get
(Italics ours) (R. 49).

th~·

Mr. Purkey was present

during the conversation between Naylor arid
Dalton relative to picking up the cars <m4 he
recalled the incident as te11olfS:
")ir. Naylor had these two
ears up there and be thought that
he had some other parties to go
get them. Well, I believe it was
Friday afternoon or Saturday morning. I can't remember which,. that
these other parties called him up
and said they couldn 't go. So Mr.
Naylor was·worried about who he
eould get and I believe that Jack:
eame up. Mr. Dalton eame up into
the parts or to the front of the
office and Mr. Baylor told him
that he had these two cars there,.
and Mr. Dalton said, ttviell. ~~e
will &o s;et.them.• I don't remember just wlien 'tnat was, whether
that was Friday or S:aturday, but
anyway the arrangem:ents was made
that they shottld go t«!t them and

I was to five them a cheek for
$25.00." · R. 49-50). (Italics. ours)
Dalton t.estiiied that

~aslor

asked

him to go to Rock Springs to ge·t the cars.

His

statement is in direct conflict w.lth Purkeyts
testimony.

Obviously there is evidence in the

record from which the comm,ission C(ruld. have

found that Dalton volunteered to take the trip

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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for no remuneration.

In view o:t these conflict-

ing statements, can it be said that the eommis,.-

sion acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
believil'lg the testimony

ot Purkey

financial inte-rest in the outcome

who had no
o~

the pro-

ceedings ratther than Dalton, whose t$Stimony

would obviously be influenced by

h1~

financial

interest?
,.here is additional evidene,e in the

record to support the eoadssionts finding
that Dalton volunt-eerecl to get the cars for no

remuneration.

Porter# Dalton's partner, testi-

fied that he told his wife bewas going to Roek
Springs to look !or a new car when in fact u(w)e
were going out on a binge.••

Porter te$tified

as follows-:

•we went on several trips
and it was easy to tall my.wife
we were going to look at a tJar
if we were going to_so·out on a
binge. And'that's thetruth or
it •. " (R. 65).
Purkey's statement that Dalton volunteered •Well. we will go get them• and Porter's

st.tement
that they were going out on ;!!_!?_inge; .
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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s;f'

'

support the eommissionts finding that Dalton was
a volunte-er.

In view of this substantial evid-

ence,. the co:rmnission 11as compelled to find that

Dalton was a volunteer.

It clearly was

.~

unreasonable for the Co-mmission 'teo have found
that Dalton was not an employee, in the ordinary.
meaning of the term,. or under the irlorkmen •s

Compensation Act, for he was either a volunteer
or an indeP!ndent, contractor.

(Italic.s ours}.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIOri OF

THE COMMISSION WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS IN
REVERSI~G

ITSELF WITliOUT T.AIUNG ANY ADDITIONAL

EVIDE~JCE.

The Industrial Commission initiallz
found that the applicant Sherman Dalton was an
employee of the Wayne Rasmussen Company at the
time of his injury and that he
compensation.

v;~s

·entitled to

Within thirty days after writte-n

notice of the decision, the Wayne Rasmussen Gorn-

pany and Guarantee Insurance Company filed a

petition for rehearing.

The petition for crehear-
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ing asked the commission to redetermine the

question

cf

whether or not there was a contract

of employment existing betw·een the plaintiff

and

defendant~

and if' the m•dical expenses in-

curred by the applicant were reasonable.
petition for rehearing was granted.

The

The order

granting the rehearing stated:
urt is ordered that the

request for rehearing filed
herein by def'endantts attorney
on the 12th day of November,
1957, be and the same is hereby
granted.•
This court has previously held that
the effect of granting a rehearing is to vacate
and set aside the prior orde:r or judgment of
the commission and requires

tried anew.

tha~ the

case be

See Carter v. Industrial Cprr411ission,

76 U. 520; 290 P.776, Laws v. Industrial Commissior
116 u. 4)2, 21~ P.2d 194.
At the rehearing the commissioner

stated that it was a hearing de £2!Q and that
he assumed that the parties were willing to
stipulate that the transcript of the prior

pro"::

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 12 ...__

eeedings could be received in evidence.

parties so stipulated.

Bot.h

Evidenee was then intro-

duced eonee.rning the medical expenses incurred
by the applicant.

Af't§ir the rehearing the

cornmission reve:rsed i't:s former order and found

that the

app~icant

was not an employee but was

either a volunteer or an independent ·contractor.
This action was taken by the commission before
the initial ord.er had become final.

Mter the

commission had entered i'ts order denying compensation t}.le
rehea~ng.

denied.

app~icant

filed a petition for

This petition for rehearing was

The order deny.in& compensation then

became the :final order of the e.onmdssion.

The

applicant appealed to this court from that order.
In the concluding paragraph or its
opinion this eottrt stated:
•we appreciate that, the
Commission has.the prerogativ•
of making the determination or
faets which will not be disturbed
in the absence of capricious or
arbitrary action. Howeve.r, due
to the fact that on the rehearing
no new evidence was presented, a
complete about faee would be so
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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inconsistent as to eompel us-to
reverse the second. order.•

\faa the action taken by the commiasion
in reversing itaelf without taking any additional
evidence so arbitrary or e.aprleious as to reutuire

or

a reversal

ThiJ:t

its decision?

eaurt is saying that if the com-

mission grant.s a rehearing. whieb

~

taeto

vacates the prior order, it cannot reviel'l the
facts and law and corre-ct wllat it believes to

be a previous erroneoua order.·· Is the Industrial
Commission~

an administrative body, to be h.eld

to a more rigid eo de o.f pro eed't'lre than a trial

court?

Under the Ut.ah Rules of Civil Procedure

a trial eour-t is given the prerogative of changing its mind be.for·e a judgment becomes final as
evidenced by Rule 50(b) 1 where a judge may grant

a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and Rule
59(b)(7) where b• may grant a new trial when

there is error in law.

It aeem.s inconceivable

that this cotu•t would. say that the commission's

actions were arbitrary or capricious because on
rehearing
it
carefully
the
Sponsored by the S.J.
Quinney
Law Library. Funding forrevi<twed
digitization provided by the
Institute testimony
of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

submitted at the first hearing and. studied

th~

memoranda filed by counsel and concluded that
the first order was in error and sheuld be

vacated. (R. 96)

Is the commission now to be

precluded from r,eviewing the record of a fi:,t:tst

hearing when it has granted a r-ehearing for that
express purpose?

Must the commission let an in-

correct order stand and force the parties to go
to the expense o:f appealing to this court to have
the order corrected?

This doctrine violates the

basic principles of administrative law.

The

Utah Legis1atur-e has stated that the commission
is not to be bound by any technical or formal

rules of procedure (35-l-SS u.c.A. 1953).

The

holding of this court now elevates the commission

to a position or greater dignity than that enjoyed by a trial court, that is. that it can
never revers$ itself unless it hears new evidence.
Once the order of the commission becomes final

then the aggrieved party may petition this court

for a writ of certiorari, a:nd. the final order
of the commission is the order appealed.

In
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determining whether the commission has ac'tett

arbitrarily or capriciously. this court has
announced the following rule:
•In the ease o£ denial of
compensation, the record must
disclose that there is material,
substantial,

competent~

uneontra-

dic'ted evidence sufficient to

make a disregard o! it justify

the conclusion., as a matter of
law., that tbe Industrial Commission arbitrarily and capriciously
disregarded the evidence or unreasonablyre.fused to believe such

evidence.•

Kent v. Industrial

~ssion,

381, 57 P.2d 724• · &ee also opinion

89 u.

o:f Mr.

Justice Wolf:e in Norris v. Industt'ial Commission_.
90 U. 256, 61 P.2d 413 ..

In the case at bar. this court

stat~d.

that the eommiss,ion acted arbitrarily because
it reversed itself without takinc.any additional

evidence.

This holding fails to rEH:ognize that

until an order becomes .final the commission may
try the case anew and. make an order or judgment

in lieu of the displaced .former order or judgment.

See Carter v. Industrial Commission. 76 u •

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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520,

i:9b

P. 776, where this court said:

"When a ease on merits is
fully heard and tried by the commission and on due consideration
an order is made or judgment rendered on merits, the commission
ought not grant a rehearing or
further hearing though timely and
properly applied for, except on
averments or a showing of suffiX~ent grounds or good cause
therefor. When sueh is not
reasonably or satisfactorily
made to appear, the application
for a rehearing or further hearing should be denied. Wh•n,
how.ever. sueh is made to appear
on a timely ll!!Ellcation made
therefore. and when an unrestricted
rehearing of the case on merits is
£ante<IcL the co!m:!ssion must underStand tnat the order theretofore
made or jud.fWient.rendered is displaced and vaeated and that it then
becomes itcs legil d:tttt tg again
hear ana try the cause anew and make
an order or rend- r a ud .· ent in
ieu of the dis aced former order
or ud ent.
n suc1 case · it be
so a vise , ~t may a opt the prior
findino-s made if in its ud ent
t ey sufficiently ref ect al of the
material facts as aisclosed by the
evidence, and make a nel-l order or
render a new =ud ment accordin 1
-..w.,..h·e~t.,...._e_r~i~t~b-e~t-o~t-=-h--e--..s·am··-e.........,o"'""r;.;;;;;;.;;:~l.r.;;;;f~~r-

ent effect than was the first or
displa.cea order or ,iudgment.ii

(Italics oursJ

The question be.fore this court in cases
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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arising under the Worlanen's Compensation Act
is whether there is sufficient evidence in
the record to support the findings of the
Commission.

This court should look at the

final order of the commission and see if that

order is supported by the facts.

Until the

order of the Commission is final. there is
nothing that is reviewable and once it becomes
final it should be the only order reviewed.
In Carter

v. Industrial Commission, supra, this

court said that the granting of the rehea:rir1g
takes from the employer whatever right he had
to apply to the Supreme Court for a review for

the reason that the granting of the rehearing
leaves the cause with no final judgment or order
subject to review.

The Commission may have

granted any number of rehearing;s for the purpose
or correcting an error in law, taking new evidence or modifying a previous award, but the final

award is the order which is appealed and is subject to being affirmed or vacated.
There is nothing in the Workmen's
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Compensation Act which requires the Industrial

Commission to take new evide:nce on a rehearing
before it ean reverse itself'.
tha~

It would seem

the intent of the Legislature in giving

the Commission the right to rehear a matter
would be to give it a ehanee to revie-w the evid-

ence and the law to be certain that the order
of the commission was correct.

This Supreme Court also has the right

t.o grant a rehearing where it has failed to
consider some material point or has erred in
its conclusions.

The Industrial Commission

may also err in one of its conclusions and
should have the right to eor-rect it without the
submission of new evidence.

Until the order of

the commission be,eomes final it is subject to

change on a petition for rehearing .... The commission has the right and the duty to change an

order if it is convinced the order is in error.
CONCLUSIOlJ

This court has failed to consider
whether the Commission's final order - that Dalton
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was either a volunteer or an independent eon.i.l
tractor is supported by the evid,ence.

This court

has failed to apply the right to control test
which is axiomatic in Utah Workmen's Compensation

eases.

Applying the right to control test it is

self-evident that the Wayne Rasmussen Company
did not have the right to control Dalton in the

manner and method in which he drove the ear.

If, as :lin the case at bar. the record
is conflicting and the commission has resolved
the issues in favor of one party, then the
commission's final order should not be vacated.
As stated by this court in the opinion in the
instant ease. the eomntission has the duty to find

the facts and those .findings will not be disturbed
unless the Commission has acted arbitrarily or
capriciously.

This court erred in holding that

the Oberhansly case, supra, was not controlling
because there is substantial evidence in the

record which supports the commission's finding

that Dalt-on volunteered to drive the cars back
to Ogden._
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It is obvious that neither the appli-

cant nor the defendant acquire a vested interest
in an order .of the commission until it becomes
final, and even then the order is subject to

review by this court.
does

As long as the commission

not violate the statutes .or rudimentary

requirements of fair play, its procedure should
not be condemned.

That this was the intent of

the Legislature is apparent from 35-1-88 U.c .A.

1953. This. court erred in holding that the
Industrial Commission acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in reversing itself without taking

additional evidence.

For the foregoing reasons defendant
respectfully requests this court to grant a re-

hearing to correct its conclusions.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, QUINrna & NEBEKER

GRANT C. AADNESEN
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER

Attorneys for Petitioners
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